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Abstract 
In the last few decades the influence on economics of the ideas of T. Kuhn and I. Lakatos 
was considerable. The increasing use of terms like “paradigms” and “scientific research 
programmes”  in almost every field of economics, is indicative of the influence of these two 
philosophers. Furthermore, the introduction of the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos in economics 
gave the stimulus for work on the nature of growth of economic knowledge. The paper  
starts by presenting the main influence of T. Kuhn on theories concerned with the 
evolution of economic theory. It continues with a review of the main criticisms regarding 
the appropriateness and applicability of Kuhnian ideas for economics. The same approach 
is followed in the case of I. Lakatos. After a classification and  discussion of the main 
findings, the paper attempts to offer an interpretation of the general impact of these two 
philosophers science on ideas relating to   the development of economic theories. 
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I. Introduction 
Until the 1970’s the dominant methodological views among the vast majority of 
economists were based on  the philosophy of logical positivism. In particular, they were 
content to follow the so-called hypothetico-deductive model of scientific explanation, which 
emerged in the beginning of the century mainly from the work of the Vienna circle (Blaug, 
1980, pp.1-4, Caldwell, 1982, pp.11-18). These ideas were brought in economics mainly by   
T. Hutchison (1938). A clear indication of the powerful influence of positivism in economics 
was the great popularity of the term “positive” among economists which became widely 
known mainly from M. Friedman’s (1953) work on economic method. Although Friedman’s 
argument was rooted in economics rather than philosophy, it summarized the “mature 
positivist“ approach   (Backhouse, 1994, p.182 and Caldwell, 1982, p.173). However, in the 
last few decades the influence of post-positivist philosophers of science  (Popper, Kuhn, 
Lakatos, etc) became significant. More specifically, there was an increasing number of 
methodological works in economics that were critical of the traditional approach and also 
reflected the post-positivist spirit (see Redman, 1993, Dow, 2002).  
It can be argued that the work of Popper gave the initial momentum to the gradual  
undermining of the positivist approaches (see, e.g. Caldwell, 1982). Thus, in this sense, it 
provided the ground for the subsequent growth of the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos in 
economics. (One can note here that it was Latsis’ 1976 book which stimulated  further  
economists’ interest in post-positivist philosophies of science)**. The influence of  Popper is 
still quite substantial. However, the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos gave the stimulus for work on 
the nature of growth of economic knowledge. In other words, they made economists think 
                     
*We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
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about the way that  economic ideas develop. The increasing use of terms like Kuhnian 
paradigms and Lakatosian research programmes  indicates the influence of these 
philosophers on the formation of ideas about the development of economic theory. 
Furthermore, the substantial growth of the relevant literature is another indication of  the 
previous point (see for instance the volume by de Marchi and Blaug, 1991). 
In  the recent years however, the influence of Kuhn and Lakatos among economic 
methodologists seems to have weakened. In particular, various forms of naturalism, 
pragmatism and constructivism are gaining popularity. Furthermore, science studies and 
cultural history are viewed more appropriate as tools for the historical reconstruction of 
economics (for a comprehensive treatment of the new currents in economic methodology, 
see Hands, 2001). In spite of this, a great number of economists continue to employ Kuhnian 
or Lakatosian modes of methodological explanation in almost all fields of economics. One 
can find recent examples from the theory of choice (List, 2004), monetary economics 
(Bofinger and Wollmershauser, 2003), development economics (Fine, 2002), law and 
economics (Krecke, 2003), market equilibrium (De Vroey, 2001), health economics 
(Edwards, 2001), economic fluctuations (Louca, 2001). This implies that in spite of the 
relative decline among methodologists,  these ideas are still influential among practicing 
economists. Thus, it seems that  a critical survey of the influence of these two philosophers of 
science on the economic methodology might be useful for the appropriateness of use of 
Kuhnian and Lakatosian concepts in economics and for the further  understanding of  their 
continuing influence on economics in general. Furthermore, this survey will attempt to update 
older surveys by  examining recent uses of  Kuhnian and Lakatosian concepts. 
Given the above, the paper will start with a presentation of the main influence of  T. 
Kuhn as is found in influential works. The next section will concentrate on the main 
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criticisms concerning the appropriateness and applicability of Kuhn’s influence on the 
history of economics. The same approach is followed in the case of I. Lakatos. After a 
classification and  discussion of the main findings, the paper attempts to offer an 
interpretation of the general impact of these two philosophers of science on ideas relating 
to   the development of economic thought . 
 
II. The Influence of Thomas Kuhn 
The basic ideas of Kuhn can be found in “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” 
(1970). Very briefly, according to Kuhn a given “paradigm” guides the scientific community. 
The concept of paradigm implies a general theoretical viewpoint that members of the 
community share (Subsequently, Kuhn replaced this concept with “disciplinary matrices” for 
reasons of clarity). Scientific revolutions occur because the established paradigm faces a 
scientific crisis which occurs because of  accumulation of anomalies or unsolved scientific 
puzzles. Gradually, a new paradigm becomes dominant.  The revolutionary period is 
characterized by “extraordinary  science” while non revolutionary periods are characterized 
by “normal science”. It has to be noted that this process has psychological rather than a 
rational basis and this is the basic reason why there is what Kuhn calls the 
incommensurability problem between competing paradigms. Subsequently, Kuhn moved 
from a psychological explanation of incommensurability to one based in the philosophy of 
language (see Bird, 2002 and for a detailed discussion of Kuhn’s ideas, see Kuhn, 1970, 
2000; Redman, 1993 and Dow, 2002).  
Within the first few years after the appearance of “The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions” (first edition, 1962), a  number of economists attempted to explain the growth of 
economic knowledge by following Kuhn’s ideas. Thus, a representative example of a general 
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application of Kuhn’s scheme is  Kunin and Weaver (1971) who believe that of all social 
sciences, economics is more appropriate for the application of Kuhnian ideas. The strong 
theoretical consensus that is observed in economics, is the main reason for this. However, 
the authors caution that the level of generality at which a paradigm is defined is important for 
its successful application. Furthermore, the concept of paradigm change is more complex 
and subtle in economics, since not only our views concerning economic phenomena change 
but also the phenomena themselves.   
Historians of economics have applied  the Kuhnian approach not only to mainstream, 
but also to radical economics. The notion of Kuhnian paradigm as applied to radical 
economics was  the central theme of a special issue of the Review of Radical Economics in 
1971. The main point was that the Kuhnian approach in a wide sense, is useful in 
understanding the development of economic thought (e.g. Sweezy, 1971, Zweig,1971). 
Similarly, Eichner and Kregel (1975) argued that Post-Keynesian theory constitutes a new 
paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. 
As was noted, the Kuhnian analysis of the nature of  scientific process has two main 
components: (a)  regarding the nature and the rate of progress of the discipline  itself, namely 
if it is on a paradigmatic level; and (b) the existence of scientific revolutions in a specific 
science. In the coming pages we will explore if  these  characteristics of the Kuhnian analysis 
have found fruitful grounds in economics.  
 In regard to the paradigmatic level of economics,  the historians of economics started 
as early as in the mid  1960’s  to investigate the presence of Kuhnian  paradigms. Gordon’s 
(1965) article was the first one to apply  Kuhn’s paradigmatic process in  economics. Gordon  
(1965, pp. 123-4) argued  that the ruling paradigm in economics is Smith’s postulate of the 
maximizing individual in a free market environment. Since then, a number  of historians of 
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economic thought tried to fit  the Kuhnian approach to the development of economics. 
However,  the first example of the systematic application of Kuhn’s views to economic 
thought can be found in Coats  (1969). Coats applied Kuhn’s methodological tools to the 
history of economic thought. His main conclusion was that there has been only one 
paradigm:  equilibrium theory based on the idea of market mechanism. Some years later,  
Loasby (1971) argued that there exists the profit-maximization paradigm in economics, while 
an emerging paradigm could be the behavioural theory of the firm.  
The next systematic application of Kuhnian views was provided by B. Ward (1972). 
He adopts some of Kuhn’s criteria in order to examine if economics can be characterised 
as a mature science much like physics. His reference is the orthodox neoclassical theory. 
In his view,  the existence of an “invisible college” of neoclassical economists with 
common method and agreement concerning what are the important  problems of the field, 
indicate the maturity of neoclassical economics. Furthermore, he continues to find puzzle-
solving behaviour giving as a prime example of the classical versus the marginalist theory 
of value. Apart from the Neoclassical school,  Ward examines the development of Marxian 
economics. He discerns some puzzle-solving behaviour especially with regard to the issue 
of values and prices. However, he believes that it fits less to the Kuhnian framework since 
he is unable to  find examples of crises and scientific revolutions. As he writes “[Marxism] 
passes most of the tests necessary for a Marxist economic science to exist in the Kuhnian 
test, but in practice it has failed because of the virtual absence of an  integrated social 
system of scientists oriented toward the systematic development of  the science through 
study of problems of detail” (1972, p. 70).  
Dow (1981) claimed that general equilibrium analysis must rather be considered as a 
Kuhnian paradigm. A few years later and in more general terms, Dow (1985) uses Kuhnian 
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analysis for macroeconomic schools of thought such as Mainstream, Post Keynesian, 
Marxian and Neo-Austrian. Even more recently, G. Argyrous (1992) writes  that with certain 
modifications the concept of paradigm (or disciplinary matrices, Kuhn’s subsequently 
substitute term) can explain to a great extent the historical development of the  Neoclassical 
consumption function. Dobson (1994, p. 76) argued that financial economic theory of the firm 
shows a paradigm shift in a Kuhnian sense but he does not adequately analyses its specific 
characteristics. A more recent application of  Kuhnian approach is to be found in a study of 
the philosophical foundations of transaction cost economics. Following Kuhnian 
methodology, Miller (1993) believes that  this field serves a puzzle-solving role for 
neoclassical economics and thus it can not be considered as new-institutional economics but 
part of the orthodox school.  The above discussion is summarized in table 1a and table 1b: 
 
Table  1a. 
 
Schools of Economic Thought and Kuhnian Paradigms  
Classical Neoclassical Radical/ Post-Keynesian 
Gordon, 1965 Coats, 1969 Eichner and Kregel, 1975 
 Dow, 1985 Dow, 1985 
 Gordon, 1965 Sweezy, 1971 
 Miller, 1993 Zweig, 1971 
 Ward, 1972  
 
Table 1b 
 
Economic Theories as Kuhnian Paradigms 
General Equilibrium Theory of the Firm Consumption Function 
Coats, 1969 Loasby, 1971 Argyrous, 1992 
Dow, 1981 Dobson,1994  
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 As was mentioned, the second important characteristic of the Kuhnian analysis is the 
emergence of a scientific revolution. There are historians who argued that  Kuhnian- type 
revolution emerged in economics. More specifically, Coats (1969) after presenting the main 
propositions of a Kuhnian revolution pointed out that there was only one revolution in 
economics sharing Kuhnian features, that of the Keynesian Revolution. In another paper 
Coats (1972, pp. 308-314), more strongly than Blaug (1972, p. 277) who conceived the 
marginal revolution as “a gradual transformation”, recognized some Kuhnian elements of  this 
revolution in economics. 1  
Ward also identifies the presence of scientific revolutions. He believes that 
Keynesianism constitutes a scientific revolution although not in the strict sense that Kuhn 
uses the expression. Furthermore, by using extensively the Kuhnian paradigm shift 
methodology,  showed  that another revolution in the 20th century was that of “the formalist 
revolution” (Ward, 1972, p. 40). 2  The view that Keynes’ theory constitutes a “scientific 
revolution in the Kuhnian sense is shared by other economists apart from Ward. For 
instance, Winch (1969), Mehta (1974, 1979), Dillard (1978), Stanfield (1974), Leijonhufvud 
(1976) argue that the Keynesian revolution is a good example of a Kuhnian revolution in 
the field of economics. In the same spirit (although not with regard to the Keynesian 
revolution), O’Brien (1976, p. 103) considers that Kuhn’s system is  “for economists, a 
much more illuminating way of looking at their subject than that supplied by Popper”. Then, 
he maintains (1976, p. 105) that the marginal revolution is a case of paradigm change from 
the classical economy. In the same spirit, but much more recently, Schabas implies that  
Jevons’ ideas were revolutionary for economics and this can be explained in Kuhnian 
terms (Schabas, 1990, pp.5, 23).  
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More recently, the idea of a Kuhnian type explanation has reappeared in connection 
to Keynesian macroeconomics. In particular, McGovern (1995) argues that the failure to 
find Lakatosian novel facts in Keynesian macroeconomics must  lead to the adoption of a 
Kuhnian type investigation. As is seen from table 2 most of historians of economics identify  
the existence of the Keynesian revolution and secondly of the marginalist. 
Table 2 
 
Kuhnian revolutions 
Keynesian  Marginalist Formalist 
Coats, 1969 Coats, 1972 Ward, 1972 
Dillard, 1978 O’Brien, 1976  
Leijonhufvud, 1976 Schabas, 1990  
McGovern, 1995   
Mehta, 1974, 1979   
Stanfield, 1974   
Ward, 1972   
Winch, 1969   
 
 
 
 
III. Criticisms of Kuhn  
Apart from the positive influence of Kuhn, the application of his ideas to economics 
has also generated critical discussion and controversy. A significant number of economists 
were attracted to his views in late sixties, however, almost in the same period there were the 
first criticisms. There were two main lines of criticism: (a) the vagueness of Kuhnian  
terminology; and (b) its non-appropriateness for the explanation of economic progress. Let us 
see the first line  of criticism.   
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 The first general criticism has to do with  what constitutes a  Kuhnian paradigm or a 
revolution in economic thought. For instance, Stigler (1969) was one of the first economists to 
cast serious doubts on the applicability of Kuhn’s schema in economics given the loose 
definition of the concept of paradigm. He criticized the imprecision of  Kuhn’s definition of the 
term paradigm and argued that this is an obstacle for its testing in economics. As he 
comments  (1969, p. 225): “My main quarrel with Kuhn is over his failure to specify the nature 
of a paradigm in sufficient detail that his central thesis can be tested empirically”. This has led 
a number of economists to find the terms not only vague but confusing for the understanding 
of the history of the discipline. For example,  Blaug (1976, p. 149) maintains that term 
paradigm should be “banished from economic literature, unless surrounded by inverted 
commas”. The same view is adopted by Redman (1993, p. 144) who believes that this 
terminology acts not to clarify but serves, rather, to obscure the issues. The imprecision and 
vagueness of  this Kuhnian term has also been pointed out by Johnson (1983), and  Glass 
and Johnson (1989, p.164).  It has to be noted though, that there are methodologists who do 
not think that vagueness is necessarily a negative characteristic (e.g. Dow, 1985).  
The second  line of criticism of the Kuhnian approach is that it does not fit 
appropriately to the history of economic thought. For instance,  M. Bronfenbrenner (1971) 
believes that Kuhn’s  ideas about the destruction of a theory and its replacement by another 
one has not been the case in economics. Furthermore, he does not see the crisis of the 
discipline as a cause of the emergence of new theories. In the same spirit,  Weintraub (1979) 
believes that Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions and the rise and fall of different 
paradigms, is not a correct way to approach the history of economic thought. Weintraub 
views the history of economics more as a continuing accumulation of knowledge. Glass and 
Johnson (1989, pp. 112-170) after discussing orthodox and Marxist economics view  
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economics  as being characterized by competing research programmes rather than by one 
paradigm. 
Hausman engages in a more substantial criticism. He states (1994, p. 199): 
“Kuhn’s account of disciplinary matrices provides a checklist of what to look for in 
examining the large-scale structures of economic theorizing, but the basic 
principles of microeconomics have a different status and role than do Kuhn’s 
symbolic generalizations. Consequently, economics does not fit his schema very 
well.”  
An example of a symbolic generalization in economics is that agents are self-interested. 
However, selfish agents are fundamental in much of microeconomics but not in all of it 
(Hausman, 1994, p.198). In more general terms, Hausman (1992, p. 84) writes: “The basic 
claims of equilibrium theory are not quite symbolic generalizations in Kuhn’s sense, because 
economists are not firmly committed to all of them.”  
 From the above analysis, table 3 presents  the main categories of  criticism exercised 
by historians of economic thought upon Kuhn’s explanation  in relation to  economics. 
 
Table 3 
 
Criticisms on Kuhn’s explanation 
Vagueness    In terminology Non-appropriateness   for economics 
Stigler, 1969 Bronfenbrener, 1971 
Blaug, 1976 Glass and Johnson, 1989 
Glass and Johnson, 1989 Hausman, 1992, 1994 
Johnson, 1983 Weintraub, 1979 
Redman, 1993  
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IV. The Influence of Imre Lakatos 
Many philosophers of science consider Lakatos’s ideas as being rooted in 
Popperian concepts and especially in Popper’s falsificationism. Popper’s methodological 
views were and still are very influential among economists and this might be the main 
reason why the influence of Lakatos’ methodology is much stronger among economists 
than Kuhn’s (for a collection of papers discussing  Popper’s influence on economics see 
de Marchi, 1988). Lakatos’ starting idea is that the unit of scientific achievements is not an 
isolated hypothesis but a scientific research program. (MSRP). The “hard core” of this 
programme is a framework of general hypotheses. This hard core would not be falsified by 
followers of that programme. The protective belt which surounds it, contains hypotheses, 
and observation statements which may be falsified. The “negative heuristics” is the 
condition that the hard core of the programme remains unchanged. The “positive heuristics 
consists of  a set of suggestions which develop the refutable variants of the research 
programme. The idea of scientific progress  lies in the replacement of degenerating MSRP 
by new progressive one. The new programme  provides for future research and leads to 
the discovery of novel phenomena. (for a much more detailed presentation of  Lakatos’ 
ideas see Lakatos, 1978 and Redman,1993).   
 Many historians of economics  have accepted Lakatos’ views as important 
conceptual tools for understanding the growth of economic knowledge.3 De Marchi (1991, 
p. 15) defending the Lakatosian progress type in economics, argued that such a theory is 
a useful framework for the understanding of the development of  economic ideas. 
Backhouse (1994, p.188) believes that Lakatos provides a valuable starting point  for 
understanding the growth of economic knowledge.  
 13
Given the greater popularity of Lakatosian views, one can find much more 
applications of Lakatos’ views in economic literature. Such applications took place in two 
different areas in economics. The first is related with the various schools or realms of 
thought in economics and the other with specific economic theories. We shall present such 
attempts in the following pages starting from the schools of economic thought.  
It is widely accepted that the first application of Lakatos’ ideas  to economics can be 
found in S. Latsis’  (1976) work.  Latsis  identified hard core propositions and positive 
heuristics in the scientific programme of  neoclassical economics. Similarly, Remenyi (1979) 
extended Latsis’ work by introducing much more specific characteristics of the hard core and 
by providing additional positive heuristics. The traditional schools of economic thought have 
also been identified as Lakatosian SRP. For instance, O’Brien (1976, pp. 107-9) thinks that 
the Lakatosian programme fits rather well with the Smithian SRP, having a hard core and 
positive heuristics, although it was eventually proved a degenerating one. Similarly,  R. Fisher 
(1986) discusses the marginalist school from the viewpoint of a Lakatosian research 
programme. 4 
Blaug (1975, pp. 400, 412-4)  explores Lakatos’ ideas in relation to the history of 
economic thought arguing  that the Keynesian research programme is a real Lakatosian 
one. He also uses the Lakatosian framework for explaining the quick and wide acceptance 
of Keynesian ideas. 5 Hands (1985) by counter-arguing  that the Keynesian programme is 
not progressive in the strict sense of Lakatos, forced Blaug to respond and to show (1990) 
that such a programme is rather progressive since such a program could  predict some 
novel facts (Blaug, 1990, pp. 97, 101; 1991, pp. 503-4).6 In the same spirit, Lipsey (1981) 
argued that Keynesian macroeconomics is still a progressive research programme which 
provides strong predictions with good track record.  
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As in the case of Kuhn, alternative schools have been recognized in Lakatosian 
terms. A. W. Coats  (1976, pp. 49-50) identified the Institutional school as another 
Lakatosian programme in economics describing five  hard core propositions and four 
positive heuristics. Blaug in a paper (1983), argued that the programme of   radical 
economics, although less coherent than the neoclassical one, can also be identified as a 
Lakatosian  SRP. Brown (1981) after presenting the hard core propositions of the 
Keynesian school of thought, described the main ingredients of a post-Keynesian research 
program. Another MSRP has been identified by Rizzo (1982) and Langlois (1982) with 
reference to an alternative economic approach, namely  the Austrian School of economics. 
Rizzo  and Langlois  described an Austrian programme in the Lakatosian lines having five  
hard core propositions and three positive heuristics. Nightingale (1994) tried to trace a 
Lakatosian program in the recent approach of  evolutionary economics.  He describes its 
five hard core propositions, its  protective belt content and its positive heuristics. Moreover, 
he believes that this programme  is richer than the neoclassical research programme “with 
more content to its positive heuristic, a less prescriptive hard core, and capable of 
accepting a wider range of auxiliary assumptions within its protective belt for purpose of 
using it for scientific investigations” (1994, p. 248).  The main points of  the above 
discussion are  presented in  table 4: 
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Table 4 
 
Lakatosian SRP on schools of thought 
Classical Marginalist  Neoclassical Keynesian Austrian 
O’Brien, 1976 Fisher, 1986 Latsis, 1976 Blaug, 1975 Rizzo,1982 
  Remenyi, 1979 1990, 1991 Langlois, 1982 
   Brown, 1981  
   Lipsey,1981  
 
Institutional Radical Post-
Keynesian 
Evolutionary General 
Coats, 1976 Blaug, 1983 Brown, 1981 Nightingale, 
1994 
de Marchi, 1991 
    Backhouse,1994 
 
  
As we mentioned, Lakatos approach is also used by the historians of economics to 
explain the development of specific theories. More specifically, Latsis (1972, pp. 208-212) 
by employing the key  Popperian term of  “situational determinism”, identified  a Lakatosian 
scientific research programme in economics in the neoclassical theory of the firm. More 
specifically, he stressed that both the theories of perfect competition and monopolistic 
competition form parts of the same dominant research programme “with one  identifiable 
hard core, one protective belt and one positive heuristic” (1972, p, 208). He also 
suggested that this “neoclassical programme was degenerating” (Ibid., p. 234). Similarly,  
de Marchi (1976)  finds clear indications of a  SRP in international trade theory which is 
based on the work of  Ohlin, Lerner and Samuelson.7 In the same line, Bensel and Elmslie 
(1992) argue that the generalization of Heckscher- Ohlin- Samuelson which incorporates 
 16
monopolistic competition, qualifies as a progressive Lakatosian research programme.8 
McGovern (1994) has shown that the modern international trade theory has  progressed in  
a Lakatosian manner.  
Blaug (1976)  argued that  the human capital theory is developing in a  SRP 
fashion. In subsequent work, Blaug (1980, pp. 224-239) reaffirmed  that the neoclassical 
theory of human capital has the basic ingredients of the Lakatosian  programme. He held 
that human capital theory started with the work of T. Schultz in the 1960’s and continued 
with G. Becker. The hard core of  this subprogramme according to Blaug, is defined as: 
“People spend on themselves in diverse ways not only for the sake of the present 
enjoyment but also for the sake of future benefits.” (Blaug, 1980, p.225). The protective 
belt of the human capital research programme is made of the various human capital 
theories (Blaug, 1980, pp.224-239). 
Coats (1976, pp. 53-4) identified the marginal utility explanation of value as a 
Lakatosian programme consisting of eight hard core propositions, and five  positive 
heuristics.  Wong (1978, pp. 1-3) has argued that there is a Samuelsonian programme of 
revealed preference theory  and shows it to run in a Popperian rational reconstruction 
approach. Cross (1982) by  making some adjustments in the Lakatosian process, shows 
that the development of monetarism could be explained in the same terms. More 
specifically, he argues (1982, pp. 336-7) that from 1953 until 1973 the monetarist 
approach  exhibited  increased empirical content, but  from 1973 until 1981 it experienced  
empirical and theoretical degeneration. In a similar tone, Maddock  (1984, 1991) 
maintained that the rational expectations macroeconomic program had developed in a 
Lakatosian fashion, starting at the mid 1970s and running until today.9 Moreover,  
Backhouse (1991) maintained that a modified Lakatosian programme holds for modern 
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macroeconomics. In a subsequent work (1992),  he suggested not to abandon Lakatos in 
economics but to adopt a modified MSRP “to allow for greater variety of types of research 
programme, retaining its  appraisal criterion intact” (1992, p. 32).10 
Fulton’s (1984) paper  was an early attempt  to review some attempts at the 
application of Lakatos’ methodology of SRP. He  argued that notion of MSRP should be 
applied to individual economic theories and not to the entire discipline. Then, he fitted a 
Lakatosian programme to neoclassical production theory (1984, pp. 195-201) showing its 
presuppositions, the content of the hard core beginning  in 1880s and 1990s by J.B.Clark, 
Wicksteed, Wicksell, Walras, Marshall, and others and having as its second stage the  
Hicksian theory of wages and as its third stage Robinson’s critique  of the theory of capital. 
According to Fulton, neoclassical production theory consists of three hard core 
propositions and four positive heuristics. 
Weintraub (1985a, pp. 25-6; 1985b, pp. 108-113) applies Lakatosian thinking to the 
development of the general equilibrium analysis. He identifies the hard core of this 
programme as well as some positive and negative heuristics. Then, he argued that the 
general equilibrium theory of the  neo-Walrasian type exhibits the main  Lakatosian 
properties. In another paper (1988, pp. 214-5)  he additionally  claimed that  this program 
is empirically progressive in the Lakatosian sense and presented its six hard core 
propositions, two  positive heuristics and three negative heuristics.11  
Vint (1994) used the Lakatosian methodology to show that the classical wage fund 
theory “had a period of genesis, a period of successful existence and a period of 
degeneration, refuting and abandonment” (1994, p. 5). Thus, he claimed that the “Lakatosian 
framework can provide the points of departure and analytical tools with which to approach 
many questions in the history of economics in general, and the history of classical  wage 
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theory in particular” (1994, p. 29). He found, explained and documented some specific hard 
core propositions in this theory (1994, pp. 41-2).  
 From the above Lakatosian SRP implications on various specific economic theories 
we can compose  the following table: 
Table 5 
 
Lakatosian SRP on economic theories 
Wage Fund Intern. Trade Human Capital Marginal Utility Th. of the Firm 
Vint, 1999 de Marchi,1976 Blaug, 1976, 
1980,  
Coats, 1976 Latsis, 1972 
 Bensel&Elmslie, 
1992 
 Wong, 1978  
 McGovern, 1994    
 
 
General Equilibrium Production 
Function 
Monetarism Rational 
Expectations 
Weintraub, 1985a, 
1985b, 1988 
Fulton, 1984 Cross, 1982 Maddock, 1984, 
1991 
   Backhouse, 1991 
 
 
 
V. Criticisms of Lakatos 
As far as Lakatosian ideas are concerned, one can argue that given that his views 
have had much more influence among economists, one can also find more detailed criticisms 
over the application of Lakatosian ideas to the growth of economic knowledge. The  more 
general criticism is similar to the one applied to Kuhn and refers to the fact that  Lakatos’ 
ideas developed with main reference to Physics. Thus, many economists such as 
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Leijonhufvud (1976) and Hutchison (1976) believe that the differences between the two 
disciplines are many and significant. This renders the application of Lakatosian methodology 
to economics extremely problematic. Apart from the general criticism, there  have been  
specific attacks concerning the  Lakatosian explanation for the advancement of economic 
science: (a)  looseness in hard core propositions; (b)  vagueness in  terminology;  (c)  non-
appropriateness for explaining the advancement of economics, d) problems of empirical 
testing and e) justification for the status quo.  
Let us see now  some of the main criticisms  starting with Maki (1980) who argued 
that  the Lakatosian concept of “hard core” is too narrow to be applied to economics. 
Similarly, Hoover (1991) argues that the new classical economics cannot be characterized in 
terms of  an invariant set of hard core assumptions. Another  example of relevant criticism is 
taken by Hausman (1994) in regard to Weintraub’s (1985a,b) application of Lakatos to 
general equilibrium theory. Hausman (1992, p. 88; 1994, p. 204) argued that some hard core 
propositions of general equilibrium theory have also been accepted by members of 
alternative schools like Marxian and Institutionalist economists. Furthermore, the hard core 
cannot include the assertion that preferences are complete or transitive, because there are 
neo-Walrasian explanations which involve incomplete or intransitive preferences. 
In regard to the second kind of criticism, some historians have attacked the Lakatosian 
framework in the same terms as in the case of Kuhn. Redman (1993), for instance, cites  
works by economists who use Lakatosian terms. As she shows (1993, pp. 144-5) it seems 
that there is  confusion regarding the use of the term “research  programme”. Even 
supporters of the Lakatosian approach admit that there is still some confusion among 
economists as to the usage  and precise meaning of these terms (see e.g. Glass and 
Johnson, 1989, and Hands, 1993, p.69). 
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 The third   line of criticism focuses on the view that the adoption of Lakatosian 
methodology does not adequately explain the advancement of economics. More 
specifically, Hands (1984) argued that  since economics lack “crucial experiments”,  the 
Lakatosian growth of economic knowledge process dos not fit well. Given this,  he later  
(1985) argues that a  modified version of  MSRP is needed. In the same paper, he also  
argued against  Blaug’s attempts in  analysing a Keynesian MSRP and against  Weintraub 
for presenting a neo-Walrasian programme. More specifically, Hands believes that the 
criterion of factual novelty was too rigid to be applied to economics (Hands, 1985, p.7). For 
instance, the success of Keynesian economics was not due to its empirical content but on 
other social factors. Many of the facts that Keynes predicted were already used in the 
construction of the theory (Hands, 1985, p.9). The same view is supported by Caldwell 
who  thinks that some of the facts that Keynes had predicted were false (Caldwell, 1991, 
p.101).   In a subsequent  paper  (1990, p. 70), Hands restates his view that  the 
Lakatosian type of scientific progress to be too narrow to be fitted in economics. He also  
re-emphasized the weakness of economics to predict novel facts,  a criterion held by 
Lakatos as an important one in appraising rival scientific programmes (1990, p. 78).12  
Another line of criticism of Lakatosian ideas has to do with the empirical testing of 
theories. It has been argued that economists were very successful in producing theoretical 
but not empirical criticism of theories (de Marchi, 1991, pp.15-17). This means that  non-
empirical criticism has proved to be much more effective than empirical criticism. Lakatos’  
emphasis on predicting and confirming facts proved too narrow for the scope of  criticism 
in economics (see also Shearmur, 1991, p.42). 
Finally, a number of authors have claimed that Lakatosian views have served as a 
justification for dominant theories. Hands (1993, p.68), for instance, maintains that 
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Lakatosian ideas appeal more to economists because they are “softer” than Popperian 
falsification and also because they can be employed to defend the existing theories and 
practices of economics. In the same spirit, Mirowski (1987, p.296) asserts that Lakatosian 
methods serve basically as a justification of the current scientific status quo. Support for 
the same argument is also provided by de Marchi (1991). Closer to this view is 
Backhouse’s idea that economists found Lakatos attractive because the appraisal criterion 
he used was already, perhaps for very good reasons, well established (Backhouse, 1994, 
p.181)13.  
Although Lakatos’ approach seems to have been the most popular among 
economists, there are signs that a growing number start to have serious reservations. For 
instance, there have been specific criticisms of the Lakatosian approach in a volume edited 
by de Marchi and Blaug (1991) in which a number of theorists expressed doubts concerning 
its application to specific subfields. Some of the criticisms of this volume are the following: 
Bianchi and Moulin (1991) argue that the Lakatosian approach has failed to capture the 
insights from game theory; Morgan (1991) believes that it has failed to account for the decline 
of process analysis of econometrics; Kim (1991) argues that it has failed to solve the Duhem-
Quine dilemma. In more general terms, Steedman (1991) argues that Lakatosian 
methodology is not very useful in trying to understand the relationships between different 
economic theories. In the same spirit, Salanti (1994) maintains that economic methodologists 
are increasingly dissatisfied with the Lakatosian criteria of theory appraisal. Although as he 
observes, historians of economic thought continue to employ Lakatosian categories.  
 The  recapitulation of all the above criticism exercised upon the Lakatosian 
explanation  is shown in table 6. 
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Table 6 
 
Criticisms of Lakatosian  explanations 
Looseness of Hard Core Vagueness of Terminology Non-appropriateness for 
Economics 
Hausman, 1992, 1994 Hands, 1993 Caldwell, 1991 
Hoover, 1992 Glass and Johnson, 1989 Hands, 1984, 1985, 1990 
Maki, 1980 Redman, 1993 Salanti, 1994 
  Steedman, 1991 
 
 
“Justification” for current 
status quo  
Problems of Empirical 
Testing 
Specific Criticisms 
Backhouse, 1994 de Marchi 1991 Bianchi and Moulin, 1991 
de Marchi , 1991 Shearmur, 1991 de Marchi and Blaug, 1991 
Hands, 1993  Kim, 1991 
Mirowski, 1987  Morgan,1991 
 
 
V. Concluding Comments                          
 
The starting point of this work was the influence of the scientific philosophies of Kuhn 
and Lakatos in economic thought and the main criticisms of the application of their ideas to 
economics. Although the discussion was by no means exhaustive, it enables us to make 
some general observations. The first general observation is that the influence of Lakatos 
seems to be much stronger among economists than that of Kuhn’s. Chronologically, Kuhn’s 
ideas were introduced first in economics in the late 60s and early 70s. In the first few years 
the Kuhnian influence was stronger but it progressively declined. The Lakatosian influence 
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appeared later but as it was pointed out, it was stronger.  The Lakatosian influence also 
diminished with time. 
 The second observation has to do with the appeal of the notion of Kuhnian paradigm. 
It seems that a limited number of economists recognized the Classical and the Neoclassical 
schools of thought as paradigms, but the application of this notion to individual economic 
theories like the theory of the firm or general equilibrium theory was stronger.  More popular 
among economists was the use of the idea of Kuhnian scientific revolutions. In particular, the 
concept of Kuhnian revolution with reference to the Keynesian revolution has been supported 
by many economists. The third point concerns the thrust of the critical attitudes towards 
Kuhn’s views. The vagueness of Kuhnian terminology and also the appropriateness of 
Kuhn’s schema for the evolution of economic thought were the two main criticisms.   
The application of the Lakatosian notion of scientific research programmes to 
economics was the next observation of the discussion. A number of SRP in economics have 
been identified like classical, marginalist, Keynesian, Austrian and other. Furthermore,  there 
are numerous examples of  individual economic theories which have been interpreted as 
Lakatosian SRPs. Human capital theory, the theory of the firm, general equilibrium theory  
and rational expectations theory are some of these examples. As far as the criticism of 
Lakatosian applications to economics are concerned, the main lines were similar to the ones 
that we saw in the discussion of Kuhn. In particular, economists were focusing on the 
vagueness of Lakatosian terminology and also the appropriateness for economics. However, 
there were three additional lines of criticisms. The first  had to do with the  basic Lakatosian 
notion of the hard core. A number of economists seem to believe that this notion is too loose   
to be applied to economics. The second criticism had to do with the problematic nature of 
empirical testing in economics. The third line of criticism was more cynical in the sense that 
 24
some economists thought that the Lakatosian framework served only as a defense of 
dominant economic theories.  
One can argue that in spite of the criticisms the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos have had 
positive effects. The most important  effect was   the stimulus that these ideas gave to the 
study of the growth of economic knowledge.  Indeed, there has been a proliferation of 
economic literature dealing with the structure of economic theories. Attempts to combine the 
two theories in order to synthesize a new one which might fit better to economics, is another 
example of positive effects (e.g. Goodwin, 1980). Furthermore, one can observe some recent 
trends to draw from other more modern philosophers of science (for instance, Pheby (1988) 
attempts to draw from the work of L. Laudan). This leads to the important issue of the 
appropriateness of scientific philosophies for economic thought. Some authors believe that 
economists have the habit of attaching to philosophy of science with a time lag (Rosenberg, 
1986, p.136). As Redman states (1993, p. 143):”…the fascination with Popper, then Kuhn, 
and finally Lakatos represents a simple chronological succession that lags the developments 
in the philosophy of science.”  Our discussion and the recent interest with the work of more 
modern philosophers of science supports the above view.  
Furthermore, given that Kuhn’s and Lakatos’ ideas were initially embraced but 
subsequently criticized by many economists, our discussion also supports the emerging view 
among historians of economics and economic methodologists,  that ideas imported from the 
philosophy of the  Natural sciences seem to be inadequate and rather limiting for economic 
thought (for a review see Zouboulakis, 2001). Thus, it can be argued that other alternative 
models of scientific evaluation might be more appropriate for the case of economics. The 
Science Studies approach, the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Cultural history are 
examples of alternative approaches which are  gaining acceptance among economists as 
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modes of  historical reconstruction (see for instance, Amariglio, 1988; Maki, 1992; 
Backhouse, 1997; Weintraub, 1999; Hands, 1997,2001).  
It seems that the followers of the Kuhnian and Lakatosian explanations in economics 
could not respond in a convincing way to the number of criticisms that we saw. Thus, 
economic methodologists have started to move away from such explanations. This is also 
supported by the fact that in the last few years, the interest of historians of economic thought 
and methodologists, concerning the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos has greatly diminished. 
However, as was observed, a large number of practicing economists continue to use the 
basic outlines of these two philosophies of science. One can interpreter this, as an example 
of persistence to a given theoretical framework or “mumpsimus” as J. Robinson has termed 
this phenomenon. Theories of science which emphasize the role of historical, sociopolitical 
and cultural factors might offer  explanations for this persistence (i.e. Bloor, 1983). 
Furthermore, “mumpsimus” to certain economic theories has been analysed by a number of 
authors (see for instance Hill and Rouse, 1977; Arouh, 1987). The reluctance of many 
practicing economists to abandon doubtful methodological approaches might be another  
recent case of  mumpsimus in the field of economics.  
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NOTES 
 
1. On the other hand,  Bronfenbrenner (1971) believed  that the three revolutions in 
economics (1776, 1871, 1936) took place through a dialectical process and maintained that 
these revolutions could be identified only  by modifying Kuhn’s theory. 
 
2. Pernecky (1992, p. 131) argued that "the Kuhnian model is insufficient in providing an 
explanation for the Keynesian revolution because there is much overlap between the pre-
Keynesian and Keynesian paradigms". 
 
3.The significant influence of Lakatosian views can also be seen from their popularity 
among many econometricians. For instance, Hendry (1993) appeals to Lakatos’ ideas  in 
order  to support his econometric methodology. 
 
4. Rosenberg (1986, p.138) believes that the methodology of scientific research programmes 
“is useful for understanding the rise of marginalism, the Keynesian revolution and the rational 
expectations counter-revolution”. 
 
5. For an argument against Blaug’s interpretation see Fawundu (1991). 
 
6. This  argument was criticized by Caldwell (1991, pp. 101-20). 
 
7. Robbins  (1979, pp. 51-2) agrees that the Lakatosian process could be applied in the 
observations of  Latsis and de Marchi  but also  in other episodes of the history of economic 
thought. However, he questioned  the applicability of such approach “to the development of 
branches of more general theory”, such as  the theories of value and distribution, and of 
economic  growth (Ibid., p. 52). 
 
8.  Hands  (1985, pp. 120-1) argued that such a programme is coming closer to  “a legitimate 
Lakatosian rational reconstruction  of a particular step in the development of an economic 
research program”.  
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9.  Klamer (1984, p. 286) in the New Classical economics or the rational expectation 
approach recognized an “analysis resembling Lakatos’ positive heuristics”. 
 
10. Janssen (1991, p. 697) examining the microfoundations and the modern 
macroeconomic “schools” argued that neither monetarism nor Keynesianism shared  wide 
or  narrow Lakatosian ingredients. 
 
11. Salanti (1991) and Backhouse (1993) criticized Weintraub’s argument about the 
significance of the programme of general equilibrium and its relevance with the Lakatosian 
methodology. Similarly, Janssen  commented  (1991, pp. 698-9) that the “general Equilibrium 
analysis” a wider programme than the  neo-Walrasian explored by Weintraub, has no positive 
or  negative heuristics.  
 
12. However Blaug (1990, p. 504) contrary to Hands,  insisted that “Lakatos was quite right 
to highlight the prediction of novel facts” as necessary ingredient of a “better” programme. 
 
13. It has been argued recently that Kuhnian ideas have also provided a shield against 
criticism for mainstream economics (see Fullbrook, 2003). 
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